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A more fundamental distinction
for the contemporary economy
between employee and
independent contractor status
by Michael C Harper

L
THE RESTAEMENT OF
EMPLOYME3NT LAW

rationales in other jurisdictions that had ruled, but it would
not necessarily embrace a majority position if the minority
position was more persuasive. The first set of Restatements

The common law remains an intellectual battle ground

were completed over the next two decades in important

in Anglo-American legal systems, even in the current age of

common law topics, including contracts, torts, property,

statutes. This is true in significant part because the common

judgments, and agency. By the 1950s, the ALI started a new

law provides legitimacy for arguments actually based on policy,
ideology, and interest. It also is true because of the common

generation of Restatements Second, and by 1987 issued the

law's malleability and related susceptibility to significantly

on some fourth generation products. There has been only one

varied interpretations.

Restatement of Employment Law, however, which took over a

Mere contention over the meaning of the common law

first of the third generation. The ALI is indeed now working

decade to achieve membership approval in 2015.

to provide legitimacy for modern statutes is most often not

The ALI probably had not turned to employment law as a

productive of sensible policy, however. It generally produces no

separate topic in the twentieth century because the common

more than reified doctrine unsuited for problems the common

law principles relevant to the regulation of employment

law was not framed to solve. Yet, when viewed more flexibly,
not to find doctrinal rules, but rather to find insight from the

relations were expressed in contract, tort and agency law.

collective judgment of judges about the weighing of social

or labour law is governed primarily by a matrix of statutes.

values, examining the common law may have a different kind

Nonetheless, the ALI Council in the early twenty first century

of use for modern policy makers.

approved preparation of a Restatement that would bring

I came to appreciate all of the above in my work as a Reporter
for the Restatement of Employment Law (Restatement)
project of the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI was

Furthermore, in the US as in the UK, employment and/

together in one book the American common law principles
that provide a background to our statutory matrix.
I was assigned as a Reporter to prepare drafts of the

founded in 1923 to help clarify and simplify common law in

first chapter of this Restatement,

America by the production of what are called Restatements of

the employment relationship that not only would set the

that law. The membership of the ALI includes several thousand
distinguished American lawyers, judges, and academics, invited

boundaries for our project, but also, and more importantly,
would articulate an effective default rule for the scope of most

to join through a membership process. The Restatements must

American employment protection and benefit statutes. The

be accepted not only by a final vote of the general membership,
but also first by a self-perpetuating inner Council of about 50

reason it would do the latter is that most federal employment

members. The Restatements are to articulate in black letter

"employee" and then define employee in a meaningless circular

with supporting illustrations and comments a wise synthesis

fashion to be "any individual employed by an employer." As a

of the sometimes variant positions taken by courts in the more

result of this circularity, the US Supreme Court for at least

one that would define

or labour statutes define coverage through use of the term

than 50 judicial systems that apply American law. One of the

the past 40 years has invoked the "common law" to provide

ALI's directors explained that the Restatements should take

legitimacy for its opinions concerning the scope of federal

a position on an issue that would be taken by a wise judge

employment statutes that offer protection to employees but

in a jurisdiction that had not yet ruled on the issue. This

not to independent contractors.

ruling presumably would be influenced by holdings and their
The Supreme Court's invocation of the common law may
Am

rsve I f
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have provided some legitimacy, but it certainly has not provided

has stated only, and unhelpfully, that "[n]o one of these factors

clarity. The reason for this lack of clarity in the US is not simply

is determinative." Furthermore, in a case interpreting the

the many state court jurisdictions with the authority to make

circular definition of employee in the Employment Retirement

their own common law, and a federal court system that since

Income Security Act (ERISA) the court cited not only the

1938 has been denied the authority to make general American

Restatement Second, but also an Internal Revenue Service

federal common law not tied to the interpretation of statutes

ruling that sets forth "20 factors as guides in determining

(see Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins 304 US 64 (1938). It also is

whether an individual qualifies as a common-law "employee"

because the state court systems have not been able to develop

in various tax law contexts" (Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co

a clear consensus on a definition of the employee relationship,
even with the assistance of the ALI's Restatements.

v Darden 503 US 318 (1992)) The court, however, has not

explained its choice of listed factors or their relevance to
any essential difference between employees and independent

It was not as if the ALI did not try to provide a meaningful
definition, even before the recent Restatement of Employment
Law. Agency law's treatment of the master's vicarious or

contractors that relates to the general purpose of federal
statutes that use employment status to define the scope of their
protection or benefit conferral.

respondeat superior liability for the torts of servants required

a definition of servant, and all three of the Restatements of

In my view, multifactor tests can be helpful when a legal

Agency have attempted to provide one, primarily through

question turns on highly variant factual contexts. They cannot

a right to control test.

The mid-twentieth century Second

alone provide adequate rules of decision, however, without a

Restatement of Agency, which remains the most influential on

structure provided by an ultimate question the various factors

this issue, defines servant as "a person employed to perform

are to answer. Without such a structure, such tests offer only

services in the affairs of another and who with respect to

minimally confined judicial discretion. Factors can be tallied

the physical conduct in the performance of the services is

without regard to relative weight, or alternatively ranked in

subject to the other's control or right to control"(Restatement
Second of Agency

§

220(1)). The Restatement Second of

importance and subordinated, without the judge revealing
what considerations are actually driving a decision.

Agency recognised, however, that the decisions could not be
fully captured by so simple a formulation. A "full-time cook",
"ship captains, "managers of great corporations," a "traveling
salesman," and "skilled artisans ...

with whose method of

accomplishing results the so-called master has neither the
knowledge nor the desire to interfere," all could be servants
regardless of the attenuation of the master's control or even
right to control physical conduct (§ 220, Comments a, e, i).

Thus, I recognised that my challenge in formulating a
definition for the employment relationship in the first chapter
of the Employment Restatement was to provide clarity through
an ultimate standard. That standard would have to offer an
explanation for at least the more cogent decisions issued by
state and federal courts purporting to apply the common law.
At the least, it would have to show the relevance of the deciding
factors in those cases. In order to be acceptable to the ALI

The Second Restatement of Agency thus supplemented the

Council and membership, moreover, it would have to build on

"right-to-control" test with a non-exclusive list of 10 factors

language actually used by the courts, especially the "control"

to determine "whether one acting for another is a servant or

language.

an independent contractor"(§ 220(2)) It did not, however,
specify whether these factors were to be used to expand the
scope of employee status beyond that indicated by the rightto-control test, or rather they were to be used in service to
this test. The Restatement Second of Agency thereby presented
judges with great discretion and lawyers with great uncertainty.

But to be truly useful and compelling the definition
also needed to distinguish between sets of workers with
significantly different needs of having other entities provide
the minimum protections and benefits that our statutes offer.
Although the definition of course would only offer a default
standard that could be modified to serve the purposes of any

The Supreme Court has not provided more clarity with its

particular statute, the definition needed at least to provide

formulation of a default definitional line between employees

an economically relevant base line, particularly because the

who are protected by federal statutes and

independent

pull of the common law's legitimacy resists modification.

contractors who are not. That formulation, which the Supreme

Furthermore, given the incentives for employers to cut labour

Court purports to be based on the common law, includes

costs by avoiding liability and responsibility for protections and

consideration of "the hiring party's right to control the manner

benefits promised by employment statutes, the definition had

and means by which the product is accomplished," but also lists

to be one that could not be easily manipulated by employers

"[a]mong the other factors relevant to [the] inquiry" 12 other

through the structuring of their labour market and their formal

factors, including six that were at least similar to those in the

contractual commitments.

Restatement Second list (see Communityfor Creative Non-Violence

v Reid 490 US 730 (1989)) The court has not explained why
it provided additional factors or declined to include others in
the Restatement list. It has offered no guidance on the relative
weight that is to be given to the factors, and has even declined
to confirm a primary role for the "right-to-control" factor. It

The final adopted draft, in the critical language of the
Restatement of Employment Law's first section, states that:
an individual renders services as an employee of an employer
..

the employer controls the manner and means

by

if

which the

individual renders services, or the employer otherwise eJectively

prevents the individual from rendering those services as an

developed capitalist economy who can render service with

independent businessperson. ...

control of capital and of labour are in a fundamentally stronger

An individual renders services

as an independent business person and not as an employee when

economic position to protect their own interests and provide

the individual in his or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial

for their own benefits than those who cannot. Second, a

control over important business decisions, including whether to

distinction between independent discretion and controlled

hire and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and

alignment also provides a basis for determining whether there

where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide

is another entity, or entities, that can more appropriately be

service

assigned responsibility for the protections and benefits than can

Law,

to other customers (Restatement of Employment

§

1.01).

the workers themselves. If the workers do not have discretion
to serve their own independent interests, if their service is to

This language, a product of several drafts, is not as direct as
I would have preferred. It represents a necessary compromise
with others centrally involved in the process and, as suggested
above, with the common law's language of control. The use

be aligned with the interests of a controlling entity, then that
entity, or entities, can appropriately be assigned responsibility
for the protections and benefits that the polity has determined
are warranted by their work.

of the word "entrepreneurial" may be particularly unfortunate
because it may suggest to some a quite different and, in my
view, fully unhelpful "opportunity of profit or risk of loss"
standard.
Yet, the formulation when read carefully should convey
the central idea that employees are those rendering service
without actual control over the use of capital, including their
own human capital, and the labour of others, to advance
their own interests independently of the interests of others.
The standard is much better encapsulated as an independent
business standard than as an entrepreneurial opportunity
standard. The so-called common law standard of employer
control over the manner and means of service is presented as a
sufficient but not necessary way by which an employer prevents
a controlled employee from operating an independent business
by the allocation of capital and labour. As explained in the ALIadopted comments to the formulation, workers whose manner
and means of work are controlled by another entity are not
allowed to make capital and labour allocation decisions for any
independent interests that are not fully aligned with those of
the controlling entity. Furthermore, as also explained in the
comments, other workers - including the managerial, skilled,
and off-site workers whose manner and means of work are not
controlled - still may be prevented from rendering services in
their independent interests by an alignment of their duties with
the interests of an employer. Stated most succinctly, service

IL

UNITED KINGiOM LAW
I had hoped that the use of the common law in the United

Kingdom to define the scope of employee protection and
benefit laws would offer support for my clarification and
enhancement of a default scope definition for American law.
After all, American jurists seeking legitimacy might view English
common law to provide both the antecedents and a parallel
subsequent path for American common law. Furthermore,
the UK has enacted perhaps an even more tangled matrix of
employee protection and benefit statutes.
But alas! In defining the scope of employee protection and
benefit statutes, UK decisions also have offered unfocused
multifactor tests similar to those that have lacked clarity in
the US; and worse, UK decisions also have applied formulaic
doctrinal distinctions that seem to be based on an unnecessary
application of the common law of contracts. Like that of the
US, UK law has set the limits of employment statutes through
a definition that purports to be based in part on the common
law. Like US courts, and like the ALI Restatements of Agency,
UK courts have understood that a simple actual control or right
to control test cannot make distinctions that accord with past
precedents, including those defining respondeat superiorliability.
In response, UK courts have stressed additional factors - such
as the degree of integration into the organisation and the

is rendered as an employee rather than as an independent

worker's opportunity-for-profit-or-risk-of-loss -

business person when the service renderer does not render

resorted to multifactor analyses, like that endorsed by the US

the service with significant discretionary control over capital

Supreme Court, without explaining the ultimate question that

and labour. Retaining such control enables business persons to

and often

application of the multiple factors is to answer.

advance their own economic interests without also advancing
proportionately the interests of another party who has denied
such control.

Significantly, because UK employment statutes require that
protected or benefitted workers be in a contractual relation
with an entity responsible for providing the protections

In my view, there are two very strong reasons why the best
default definition of employee for employee protection and
benefit statutes is based on the difference between independent
discretionary control over capital and labour, on the one hand,
and the lack of such control and the consequent alignment of
the worker's service with the interests of a controlling entity,
on the other. First, any rational delineation of those who are

or benefits, British courts have determined it necessary to
consider the common law of contracts in setting the scope of
these statutes. In doing so, some of these courts added two
further doctrinal impediments to clarity in British law.
The more important doctrinal impediment formulated by
your courts through the use of contract law is the conditioning

assumed to be granted statutory protections and benefits as

of employment status on a mutuality of obligations between

employees should be based on relative need. Workers in a

workers and a putative employer (see, eg, Nethermere Ltd v
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Gardiner [1984] ICR 612) This has provided special difficulties

relationship and thus can be set aside as shams (Autoclenz Ltd

for casual workers who are not given commitments of future

v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41; [2011] 4 All ER 745 [2011] ICR

work and who are not asked to commit to accepting any work

1157 SC.

that is offered. The British courts have held that such casual
workers do not have a general or "umbrella" contract on which
their status as employees can be based (see Carmichaelv National
PowerPlc [1999] 4 All ER 897 HL) There is no reason, however,
that a worker who renders service outside the coverage of a
general "umbrella" contract in consideration for an employer's
promise of remuneration should be treated differently under
employee protection or benefit statutes than a worker who
renders service that he or she earlier pledged to perform and
the employer pledged to request. Whether or not workers
under or outside such an umbrella laboured for sufficient hours
over a sufficient number of continuous weeks to be covered by
a statute, they should have the same protection if their working
hours were the same. The need of a worker for protections and
benefits is surely not less if the worker has no commitment of
future work from an employer.

However, in cases where there is not a true independent
business being operated, a worker's actual discretion to share
hours with or substitute another labourer to do the same
work and collect the same pay does not mean that the actually
performed work of the contractually bound worker or the
substituted worker is in less need of protection or benefit than
work performed by a contractually obligated worker. Drawing a
distinction based solely on a personal service commitment, like
drawing a distinction based on the existence of an overarching
mutuality of obligations constitutes doctrinal formalism with
no nexus to the purpose of employee protection or benefit
statutes. Both distinctions only serve to provide employers
with possible loopholes to obtain cheaper labour by escaping
the force of employment statutes.
Parliament, unlike the American Congress, however, has

To be sure, British courts, after a period of uncertainty,
have managed to address the problem posed by the mutuality
of obligations condition by recognising that workers without
a general umbrella contract with a particular employer may
still qualify as employees based on a series of more specific
employment contracts covering each separate period of work
(see, eg, Cornwall County Council vPrater [2006] IRLR 362 (CA)).

The decisions recognise that there is an obligation to perform
and compensate service during each specific period. To achieve
protection under statutes requiring continuity of employment,
however, the workers still must be able to establish that any
break in service between the specific contracts qualifies as a
"temporary cessation of work" under the relevant employment

at least made some purposeful attempts to break the bounds
set by reified common law doctrine. I refer in particular to
the broader coverage of statutes passed by the new Labour
Government in 1998, including the National Minimum Wage

Act 1998, the Working Time Regulations Act 1998, and the
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. These statutes cover not

only workers with (a) contract of employment, but also those
subject to:
...

(

b) any other contract ...

whereby the individual undertakes

to do or peform personally any work or servicesfor another party
to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that
of a client or customer of any profession or business carried on by
the individual (Employment Rights Act 1996,

§

230(3)).

law (ERA § 212(3)).

derived by British courts from the statutes' requirement of

Also, the Equality Act 2010 prohibits race, sex, age, disability,
gender reassignment, marriage, pregnancy and childbirth,
religion or belief, and sexual orientation discrimination in

contractual status is that the employee's obligation be for

employment for those who are employed under or apply to

personal service. Even an employee who has committed to

be employed under "a contract personally to do work" (§ 83).

The other doctrinal impediment to employment status

ensuring that future committed work will be performed may
not have the actual performance of this work covered by British

All of this legislation seems a commendable attempt

employment statutes if he or she did not commit to doing the

to break free of the controlled and subordinated servant

work personally.

model of employment. The attempts fall short for several
obvious reasons, however. First, the distinctions made by the

I understand why a commitment of personal service may be
relevant to the demonstration that the service will be rendered
as an employee rather than as an independent contractor; as

definitions, especially in limb (b) of the worker definition, are
far from clear. What, for instance, is intended by the critical
word "business" in this prong? Second, this lack of clarity is

we noted in the Restatement black letter, an individual running

compounded by the absence of rationales for not expanding

an independent business in their own interest generally will

coverage in all employment protection and benefit statutes.

have

Providing especially broad coverage for any prohibition of

the discretion

to

satisfy contractual

commitments

through the allocation of workers as well as capital. Thus, the
decision in Mirror Newspaper Group Ltd v Gunning seems to have

correctly rejected employment status for a daughter who took
over ownership of her deceased father's newspaper delivery
business ([1986] ICR 145 (CA)) Moreover, the British courts

discrimination is easy to justify, but less obvious are rationales
for not providing equally broad coverage for such topics as
unfair dismissal, redundancy pay, dismissal notice, and familyfriendly leave, as for topics covered by the "'worker" definition,
such as minimum wages and vacation pay.

have mitigated the impact of the personal service requirement
by recognising that contractual provisions that allow or require

An additional problem with the expanded definitions of

substitute workers may not reflect the reality of the economic

coverage in some British statutes is their apparent allowance

of continued judicial application of the personal service and

purposes of respondeatsuperiorliability. Employer control over a

mutuality of obligations doctrines. The definitions require as a

worker is neither sufficient nor necessary for respondeat superior

condition of coverage both the existence of a contract and also

liability, while an alignment of an employee's duties with the

that this contract commit the covered worker "personally" to

interests of the employer is both necessary and sufficient.

do work or provide the service.
That master-employer control, or even right to control, is

ilL.
VICARIOUS LIABI LIT ASA COMMON
LAW SHPPORf
Ultimately, I do not think the cumbersome use of the
common law to define the scope of employment statutes in
the UK, any more than the unfocused use of it in the US, need
pose an insurmountable obstacle to the formulation of a default

not sufficient for respondeat superior liability is clear from the
"scope of employment" condition on such liability. Under
the law of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for
torts committed by its employees, even when those torts
are committed through acts contrary to the employer's
instructions, as long as the employees are acting in accord
with their duty to serve the interests of their employer within

the usual purposes of such statutes. Indeed, if used not to

the scope of their employment. Whenever the employees,
however, depart from their employer-aligned duties in pursuit

delineate formalistic barriers based on inapplicable contractual

of their own independent interests, "on a frolic of their own" as

definitional standard that can be both clear and consistent with

or master-servant models, but rather to understand how
modern societies might assign responsibility for the benefits
and protections they wish to attach to work, the common
law can contribute to a solution rather than aggravate the

described in the memorable phrase, liability for any torts they
commit is not imputed to their employer. This qualification is
not explained by the level of control exercised by the employer
over its employees because that level of control does not change

problem of defining coverage. Thus, I would like to propose

when the employees take a detour from their duties to pursue

a different use of Anglo-American common law to define a

their own interests. Rather what changes is the alignment of

default rule for coverage, consistent with what we proposed in
the Restatement of Employment Law and reachable, I believe,
through a liberal construction of the United Kingdom's
employment law statutes as well.

the employees' purposeful actions with their duties to serve
the interests of their employer.
The

misalignment

of

an

independent

contractor's

duties with the interests of even an economically dominant

The common law that can be used as a source of insight is
not that of contracts, but that of torts and agency. It is the law of
respondeat superior, the law of vicarious liability of "masters,,
for the torts of their "servants" that provided the common
law's first reason to distinguish independent contractors from

contractor, rather than some variation on a control test, also
explains why the dominant contractor is not responsible for an
economically subordinate but independent contractor's torts.
Given sufficient incentive of potential liability, an economically
dominant contractor presumably could increase its control
over the subordinate contractor. But such potential control

other workers classified as servants.

is not sufficient for vicarious liability when the subordinate
This use of the law of vicarious liability may seem both

contractor retains discretion over sufficient resources

to

superficially obvious and fundamentally misguided. It may

pursue, at least to some extent, its own independent interests

seem superficially obvious precisely because it was for purposes

in its performance of work for the dominant contractor.

of respondeat superiorvicarious liability that the common law of
both the US and the UK both first used the right to control
details of work as the central factor to distinguish servants
from independent contractors. The use of vicarious liability

Thus, control or the potential for control is not a sufficient
condition for the imposition of respondeat superior liability; the
tortfeasor also must be exercising duties in alignment with

as a source of insight for defining the scope of employment

the interests of the principal. Similarly, control or the realistic

protection and benefit statutes, on the other hand, may

potential for control is not a necessary condition of respondeat

seem fundamentally misguided because the master-servant
relationship and its central element of total subordination and
control are not descriptive of labour relationships in modern

superior liability. Such liability is imposed when employees
are performing their duties in alignment with the interests
of their employer, regardless of whether the employer is in
a position to control this performance. This explains, better

economies.

than any unpredictable multifactor test, why corporate chief
When considered

more closely,

however,

the law of

respondeatsuperior and its distinction of independent contractors

executives, airplane pilots, ship captains, orchestra maestros,
gourmet cooks, traveling salespersons and long distance truck

offer a very different and superior model from that of a fully

drivers all can impose liability on their employers through torts

master-controlled

committed while loyally performing their discretionary duties

servant for defining work that warrants

the protection of modern employment statutes. That model

in the scope of their employment, even though outside any

is one of employer cost internalisation where there is an

practical ability of their employer to control.

alignment of employee duties and employer interests. It is the
alignment of their duties with the interests of their employers,
not their employers' control over their work, that ultimately
distinguishes employees from independent contractors for

The principle of policy that justifies an alignment with
employer-interests standard for respondeat superiorliability might
be termed reciprocal cost internalisation. An entity that causes
and benefits from the service of workers should have to pay the
'te

I
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reciprocal external social costs resulting from that work, when

party victim of the tort of an insolvent independent contractor.

the workers cannot themselves pay. This principle, of having to

Both the worker and the victim must provide for themselves or

ensure payment for dangers created in your service, I believe,
has great social appeal and explains the boundaries of respondeat

seek support from society more generally.

superiorliability.

This alignment-reciprocal
however,

cost internalisation analysis,
supports a very broad scope of coverage for

The principle clearly differs from and explains better

employment statutes. The broad coverage is consistent and

these boundaries than does one based solely on economic

not burdened by the easily manipulated, formalistic categories

efficiency. Where the transaction costs of control are low,
economic analysis indicates that a dominant business with

that have plagued Anglo-American common law. Work covered

economic control over an insolvent supplier or distributor

rendered under a contract of subordinate service rather than a

should pay for the costs of the negligence of the supplier's or

contract for defined services. The latter through specifications

distributor's insolvent employee's negligence, regardless of

and conditions can be as fully aligned as the former with the

whether that employee's duties are aligned with the interests

interests of a responsible employer. The old distinction of

of the dominant business. The law of respondeat superior, as

Roman law is not useful for defining the scope of modern

it developed in the nineteenth century in both the UK and

employment statutes.

under this analysis, for instance, is not limited to work

the US, however, does not impose vicarious liability on entities
that merely benefit from the work of the tortfeasing employees
of other independent employers.
Similarly, this principle of reciprocal internalisation differs

Similarly, the coverage of work need not depend on an
employer's control, as long as the work is to be done and is
intended to be done in the interests of the employer. Further,
evenwork not integrated into the core ofan employer's business

from and explains better the boundaries of respondeat superior

may be performed in full alignment with the interests of the

liability than does the other most frequent principle of policy

employer. And coverage need not depend on the existence

used to explain this form of vicarious liability, the principle of

of a contract for future work, whether or not with mutual

distributive justice. If a wider distribution of risk could justify

obligations.

vicarious liability, any large business would be required to act

analysis of work can be applied ex post without consideration

as an insurer against the torts of employees of the most thinly

of ex ante obligations.

The alignment-reciprocal

cost internalization

connected smaller employers, at least when the employees'
torts were committed in the course of work that was somehow
related to their employer's connection with the large employer.
Needless to say, this is inconsistent with the law of respondeat
superior not imposing liability on dominant, larger enterprises
for the torts of the employees of independent business
contractors.

Significantly for American law, this alignment-reciprocal
cost internalization analysis can be applied within the definition
of the employment relationship stated in

§

1.01 of the ALI's

Restatement of Employment Law. Section 1.01, recall, states,

in its critical language, that an employment relationship exists
when an employer prevents a worker who is rendering services
for an employer to do so "as an independent businessperson."

Once the alignment of employee duties with employer

Section 1.01(b) states that an "individual renders services as

interests based on reciprocal cost internalisation is recognised

an independent in the worker's independent interest through

as central to the common law of respondeat superior, the

exercise of retained discretion to assign assistants and deploy

relevance of this law to defining the bounds of modern

capital equipment, and whether and when to provide service to

employment statutes should be clear. These statutes define

other customers." Notice that this definition of employment

the minimum protections and benefits that a modern polity

focuses on whether particular "service" or work is rendered

has determined should be associated with a given level of

as an employee, not on whether the service renderer is

work. Because these protections and benefits generally would

an employee in the abstract. Notice also that the definition

not exist in the absence of a statutory command, no entity

assumes that service rendered to serve the interests of an

can be charged with directly injuring workers by their theft.

employer is within an employment relationship unless the

Employment statutes instead impose affirmative duties on

renderers of particular service or work have sufficient control

employers. This assigning of affirmative duties to incur the

over the allocation of capital and labour used in rendering this

costs of the provision of statutory benefits and protections is

service to advance their own interests independently of the

like assigning responsibility for the costs of the torts of insolvent

interests of the party they are serving.

tortfeasors; a business or other entity should have responsibility
to pay these costs when it may reap the benefit of work aligned
with its interests. Where there is such alignment, there
should be responsibility based on a principle of reciprocity:
an enterprise with the opportunity to benefit fully from work
should be responsible for all of its potential social costs. Where
there is not the opportunity for full benefit because the work's
vector is not fully aligned with the employer's interests, a
worker denied statutory benefits and protections is like a third

The exclusion of service rendering from employment only
when the service renderer advances his or her own independent
interests makes employment turn on whether the service is
rendered in alignment with the interests of the employer.
The definition realistically assumes that misalignment will be
possible only where the service renderer retains and exercises
in the course of the service significant control over the use
of capital and other labour.

Where the legal or economic

relationship empowers the party served to prevent the service

renderer from making decisions in its own interest about how

a digital platform that does not provide any guarantee of work

capital and labour are used in the course of the service, there is

to users. The absence of mutual commitments indicates why

an alignment of interests that warrants both respondeat superior

digital platforms can pose difficulty for the application of British

vicarious liability and a default assumption, reversible of course

statutes that condition coverage on the existence of a contract

in particular legislation, that the party who benefits from

of employment that requires mutual obligations. However, as

the service should internalise the costs of ensuring statutory

the example of Uber drivers demonstrates, this kind of case

protections and benefits for the server.

has been difficult for American tribunals and commentators as
well. Even liberal academics, like the economist Alan Krueger

This interpretation and analysis of vicarious liability law
provides both a compelling and also an easily applied standard.
On the one hand, it sharply distinguishes from employment
status owners of independent businesses in a material or
component supply or distribution chain. These independent
businesses hire and assign employees and deploy equipment
and other capital in order to maximise their own profits rather

and the law professor Seth Harris, both Obama administration
veterans, have taken the position that the discretion of workers
like UBER drivers to choose when to make themselves available
to work probably removes them from the status of employee
under American common law and requires the formulation
of a new legal category of "independent worker," with some
protections, not including a minimum wage.

than those of other businesses that the independent business
owners benefit through sales or purchases.

I applaud the decision of the Employment Tribunal in Aslam

v
On the other hand, it highlights that individuals who
provide service to private or public enterprises do so as
employees unless they have control over substantial capital
or significantly differentiated human capital. Without such
control, no service provider while providing service to one
enterprise can command the ability to deploy capital or assign
assistants in its independent interests.

Uber [2016] EW Misc B68 (ET)), to treat the

Uber drivers

as workers under the "(b) limb" of the definition in the ERA,
based on a rich contextual multifactor analysis. Unlike the
ex-Obama administration officials, the tribunal recognised
that the drivers were as much in need of the protection of
the applicable employment laws as drivers of a traditional
transportation company.

A service provider

without such control, like a plumber or a gardener or a delivery

Assigning the drivers an appropriate full employee status

driver, may have discretion to provide service to others when
it is not working for the enterprise, but unless such a provider

could be made much easier and more straightforward, however,
by asking simply whether the drivers were able to utilise capital

has control over sufficient capital to increase its profits without

and labour in their own interest without directly benefiting

also proportionately enhancing its service, the provider is

aligned Uber interests in doing so. The answer of course is

serving the enterprise as an employee.

no. After logging on to make themselves available for Ubersolicited rides, the drivers had to accept most fares that Uber

In accord with the analysis drawn from respondeat superior
vicarious liability, as noted above, the Restatement

§

1.01

definition tests whether particular service is rendered in an
employment relationship, not whether a particular individual is
an employee. Thus, any individual can render service to multiple
employers in multiple employment relationships seriatim. The
fact that the plumber or gardener or delivery driver without
significant capital can serve other enterprises at different times
is not relevant to the question of whether particular service is
rendered within an employment relationship.

seriatim employment

relationships,

within a "given day, week, or other time period" in

from exchanging information to form future relationships with
riders. While in Uber's pool of available drivers, a driver had
no discretion to use the limited capital he had invested in his
car in a way that could benefit him without proportionately
benefitting Uber. The driver's duties were fully aligned with
Uber's interests. Thus, just as Uber should be vicariously liable
to third parties for injuries caused by the negligence of Uber
drivers, so should Uber presumably be responsible for ensuring

The Restatement of Employment Law indeed expressly
anticipates

offered. Uber set the price the riders paid, collected the fare,
and paid the drivers a share. Uber also prohibited the drivers

the protections and benefits defined in employment statutes.

occurring

An Uber driver's ability to use a car at a different time for the

§

riders of a competitor like Lyft is irrelevant. The alignment

1.04(a).

This also is in accord with how respondeat superior would be
applied. We would expect any principal to be liable for the
torts of an agent within the scope of their service, regardless of
how many other principals the agent served within any given
time period.

analysis is applied to particular work; as noted above, a worker
may have multiple employers seriatim.
The work of service providers connected to clients or
customers by a digital platform need not be aligned with the
interests of the platform in all cases. While the tribunal in
Aslam appropriately rejected Uber's claim that it only sold a

IV

AN APPLICATION

passenger software connection to drivers running their own
businesses, if digital workers pay their platform only a flat fee

Currently, the most prominent troublesome cases testing
the boundaries of employment statutes involve workers who
can choose when and whether to accept work, perhaps even
without a commitment to render some minimum amount of
service. Some of these cases involve "crowd sourcing" through

for each connection and also retain discretion to bargain for
their own price, employee status is not appropriate because
the workers' obligations are not aligned with the interests of
the platform. Worker obligations and platform interests would
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not be aligned in that case because the platform benefits from

control and thus do not have distinct ultimate interests. Joint

further connection fees made possible by satisfied customers

employers do have distinct interests. Nonetheless, particular

who feel they received a good bargain, while the workers are

work and thus particular workers can serve the interests of

free to attempt to reap greater benefits for themselves by

joint employers simultaneously if the interests of each do not

deploying their labour and capital at a higher price. As long

conflict with respect to that particular work. This will be the

as the platform reaps a percentage of the payment for the

case where the best rendering of particular efficient service to

worker's service, however, the obligations and interests stay as

one employer serves the interests of a second employer.

aligned as those of a traditional employee and employer.
The rendering of efficient service to one employer can serve
In the real commercial world, the business models of

the interests of a second employer in at least four kinds of

most digital platforms, like that of Uber, require some means

relationships between the two employers. First, it can do so

of control over the discretion of workers to pursue their
independent interests while servicing clients or customers

where one employer is paid for administering personnel policy,
including staffing and hiring, termination, compensation and

identified by the platforms. Thus, most work assigned or

benefits, for a second employer that directs the performance

obtained through a platform should qualify as fully protected

of work in its interests. Second, it can do so where one

employment.

employer both generally controls the work and compensation
of the employees as a service to a set of customers who have

JOINTLY RE SPONSIBLE
V
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some discretion to direct the service and ultimately pay for
the employees' compensation. Third, it can do so where one
employer is compensated by a second employer for ensuring

The use of the "contract of employment" model in UK
statutes to assign responsibility for employment protections

that work serves the interests of the second employer. And,
fourth, it may do so where the second employer otherwise has

poses even greater problems in cases where an employee's

sufficient control over the first employer to ensure that the

duties are aligned with the interests of multiple parties, but the

work is aligned with interests of the first employer that do not

employee is in privity of contract with only one. The problem

conflict with interests of its own.

might not seem to be mitigated by use of vicarious liability law,
as the commonly stated proposition that a servant cannot serve
two masters simultaneously would seem to preclude imposing
vicarious liability on two entities for the same negligence, and
thus would seem similarly to preclude multiple employer

Assigning joint and several responsibility to two employers
for the provision of the same employment benefits of course
does not mean that an employee can receive double benefits any
more than vicarious liability can result in double recovery for

responsibility for ensuring protections and benefits for the

an injured third party. One employer must be assigned primary

same work. Nonetheless, joint employer responsibility for

liability, presumably the employer most directly involved in

ensuring the protections and benefits promised by modern
employment statutes can be supported by the controlling
principle of reciprocal cost internalisation that underlies
respondeatsuperior liability.

the denial of the benefit. The most direct involvement usually
is not difficult to identify, whether the denial of a benefit or
protection comes from a discriminatory or unfair discharge,
a nonpayment of a wage, the allowance of discriminatory
harassment, an unsafe work place, or a refusal to discharge

Section 1.04(b) of the Restatement of Employment Law

a duty to bargain collectively. Any judicial determination of

expressed American law's recognition of the responsibility

primary responsibility, in any event, can always be obviated

of multiple entities to internalise the same costs of employee

by indemnification agreements between the employers, which

protections and benefits. The section states that an "an

inevitably will be in a contractual relationship. Assigning

individual is an employee of two or more joint employers if (i)

responsibility to both employers is most important in cases

the individual renders services to at least one of the employers

where the employer that seems to have the most direct

and (ii) that employer and other joint employers each control

involvement is insolvent.

or supervise such rendering of services as provided" in the
section defining the employment relationship discussed above.
This statement reflects American judicial and administrative
decisions recognising "joint employer" responsibilities. Joint
employers are distinct from single employers under American
law. Single employers are under common ownership and

